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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to investigate empirically the political talk show phenomenon 
in Taiwan. Specifically, the study examined the perceived influence of political talk shows on the 
Taiwanese audience themselves (first-person effect) and others (third-person effect), the 
attitudinal antecedents of the perceived influences, and attitude toward restrictions on political 
talk shows. Data were collected from a convenient sample of 1053 adult Taiwanese citizens via 
an online survey. The results supported the hypothesized relationships between attitude toward 
political talk shows and perceived influence of the shows on self and others. Results also 
supported the looking glass perception hypothesis whereby the perceived influence of political 
talk shows on oneself was projected onto that of others. The perceived influences on self and 
others were unrelated to attitude toward restrictions, however.    
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Open and unfiltered political communications are the cornerstone of a democratic political 
system. In Taiwan, the political communications landscape has gone through some dramatic 
changes. As a result, the Taiwanese people can now choose from a multitude of political news 
outlets and platforms, and enjoy a genuinely pluralistic political media environment. As a young 
democracy, however, Taiwan has also been facing new and difficult challenges, including its 
extremely polarized political environment, the rising power of political and commercial interests, 
as well as the presence of highly perceptible media bias. In Taiwan, as Rawnsley and Gong 
(2011) put it, “News organizations now routinely resort to sensationalism to attract bigger 
audiences and advertising revenues, leading to concerns about finding ways to regulate lurid and 
invasive reporting” (p. 324). 
One of the most conspicuous developments in Taiwan’s political communications landscape 
is the emergence of television political talk shows. Modeled after American political talk shows 
like Face the Nation, Meet the Press and backed by mainstream Taiwanese news organizations, 
these political talk shows provide information on news events, help viewers digest information 
and entertain viewers through vivid discussion and debate. Unlike traditional news, however, the 
information presented in the talk shows is often slanted by the ideologies of program hosts and 
guests who seldom shy away from expressing their views and positions in the most biased, 
cynical and inflammatory language. Despite severe criticism from media scholars and research 
organizations (e.g., Taiwan Media Watch, 2002; Jiang, 2001; Yang, 2004; Chang & Lo, 2007; 
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Tang, 2014), political talk shows have been increasingly gaining popularity among Taiwanese 
viewers.  
 The purpose of this study is to investigate empirically the political talk show phenomenon 
in Taiwan. Specifically, the study examined the perceived influence of political talk shows on 
Taiwanese public opinion, the attitudinal antecedents of the perceived influence, and public 
views toward corrective actions or policies. The first- and third-person effects hypotheses were 
the main theoretical framework from which specific research hypotheses are derived. The 
following sections of the article will present in greater detail the background of the study, a 
review of relevant literature, the hypothesized relationships among the variables, an outline of 
the research methodology, and the results of the study.      
 
The Background 
To better understand the popularity of and controversy over political talk shows in Taiwan, 
we must understand the changing Taiwanese political and media environment.  
 
The Political Environment in Taiwan 
Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC), is a democratic country in East Asia. With 
an area of 36,118 square kilometers and a population of 23.5 million (2015), the country is 
separated from the Chinese mainland by the Taiwan Strait and shares maritime borders with 
China, Japan, and the Philippines.          
After the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), the Chinese communist People's Republic of 
China (PRC), led by Mao Zedong, took control of Mainland China, while Kuomintang (KMT), 
the Chinese Nationalist Party, led by Chiang Kai-shek, moved the ROC government from 
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Mainland China to Taiwan. Since then both governments have contended to be the sole 
legitimate government of China. The “cross-strait relations” and the question of eventual 
unification have become the dominant issues between the two governments.  
Over the next few decades, Taiwan has prospered to become one of the “Four Asian Tigers.” 
Often referred to as the Taiwan Economic Miracle, the country’s GDP grew by 360% between 
1965 and 1986. Politically, however, Taiwan remained under the authoritarian rule of the KMT 
party until reforms in the late 1970s through the 1990s. It was not until 1987 that the order of 
martial law was finally lifted by the government. In 1991 the national assembly held its first 
election, followed by the first direct legislative election in 1992. In 1996, Lee Ten-hui, leader of 
the KMT party, won the first direct presidential election in Taiwanese history. In 2000, Chen 
Shui-Bien, the candidate of the opposing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the 
presidency and ended the KMT’s more than fifty years of continuous rule in Taiwan. 
 Today, Taiwan is one of the only three liberal democracies in East Asia (along with Japan 
and South Korea). As Larry Diamond (2001, p. 1), a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 
writes: “By any measure, Taiwan is a democracy today. It has regular, free, and fair elections to 
determine who will exercise government power. These elections are meaningful, in that victory 
at the polls confers real power on the winning party. Increasingly, electoral competition is 
vigorous and uncertain, as witnessed by the historic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) victory 
in the 2000 presidential election. The Kuomintang’s monopoly on the political system has been 
shattered and will never be restored.” 
However, Diamond (2001) also points out that, despite its democratic progress, Taiwan 
faces an uncertain future due to five internal problems: (1) the widespread corruption in politics 
and government, (2) the institutional weakness of the rule of law, especially the judiciary, (3) 
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polarized party politics along the lines of ethnicity (Mainlander vs. Taiwanese), (4) serious 
deficiencies in the constitutional system and the lack of consensus in the executive structure and 
the electoral system, and (5) the lack of consolidated democratic values at the level of mass 
public opinion – and the need for the government, political institutions and politicians to exhibit 
greater accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and accommodation.     
It should be noted that the problems Diamond (2001) identified are inevitably entangled 
with Taiwan’s political relations with Mainland China. Supporters of the KMT (known as the 
Pan-Blue coalition) agree that Taiwan is a sovereign country; they also favor the one-China 
principle that insists both Taiwan and Mainland China are inalienable parts of a single China. In 
contrast, the DPP and its supporters (known as the Pan-Green coalition) reject the one-China 
principle as the basis for cross-strait relations and argue that, under the ROC Constitution, 
Taiwan has already achieved de facto independence from Mainland China. The highly divisive 
disputes between the coalitions had become more intense and frequent since Tsai Yin-wen, the 
DPP leader, won the presidential election in 2016.  
For more information about the political environment in Taiwan, please refer to Appendix A: 
Taiwan Profile.  
   
The Media Environment in Taiwan 
Taiwan’s media, once tightly controlled by the government, is now considered one of the 
freest in the world. Article 11 of the ROC Constitution states that “The people shall have 
freedom of speech, teaching, writing, and publication.” The lifting of martial law and three 
peaceful transfers of political power between rival parties further solidified the freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press on the island. In its 2017 Freedom of the Press report, the 
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U.S-based Freedom House gives Taiwan the highest ratings on freedom of expression and belief 
as well as political rights and civil liberties in Asia. Likewise, the French-based Reporters 
without Borders rates Taiwan as having Asia’s freest media in 2017 with a press freedom 
ranking of 45 out of 180 countries, which is slightly behind the United States at 43, Japan at 72 
and China at 176.  
Today, there are hundreds of privately-owned cable TV channels, radio stations, 
newspapers and magazines in Taiwan, reflecting a wide range of editorial content and policies. 
Taiwan is also one of the most wired countries in the world, with close to 80% of Taiwanese 
accessing the Internet daily and about 82% of Taiwanese having a Facebook account 
(Rickardson, 2016).  
Despite progress in securing freedom of the press in Taiwan, the media have also been 
criticized for playing a controversial and negative role in Taiwan’s democratic process. The main 
criticism is that many news outlets lean heavily toward either the pro-China KMT or the 
pro-independence DPP, resulting in not only politically biased reporting but also a more 
polarized picture of Taiwanese society than it actually is. Due to rapid change and development, 
the media in Taiwan have been in an acrimonious competition environment. Intense competition 
for profits led to another frequent criticism of Taiwanese media for placing too much stress on 
cheap, entertainment-oriented and even sensationalist news reports (Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 
2012).     
In his meticulous review of the changing roles of media in Taiwan, Huang (2009) concludes 
that the fierce competition in the market and excessive commercialism have severely damaged 
the professionalism and credibility of the media. “In Taiwan, the media have long been labeled 
as the ‘rumor, gossip, abuse and slaughter industry.’ They are labeled as ‘mad dogs’ in a 
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democratic society” (Huang, 2009, p. 15). Negative public perceptions of the media have 
increased to the point that many people attribute Taiwan’s current disorderly politics almost 
entirely to the media. “Taiwan’s media became unprincipled and untrustworthy because of its 
involvement in political struggles and the fierce in place. The public interest became the main 
loser” (Huang, 2009, p. 20). The lofty view of media as the fourth estate or a guardian of 
democracy faces criticism as media are frequently under pressure to achieve commercial profits, 
increase their market share of audiences, and maintain ideological predispositions. Indeed, the 
media have been criticized as being lapdogs for certain socio-economic groups and political 
parties and as active propagators of specific societal thinking and political agendas. 
 
Television Political Talk Shows in Taiwan 
Much of the current criticism of the quality of Taiwan’s journalism focuses on the 
numerous TV stations, including Taiwan’s seven 24-hour cable news operations. In a 
hyper-competitive environment, most seem to be investing less and less in programming, despite 
their attractiveness to advertisers due to TV’s high penetration rate at 99.37%. To save money, 
the stations tend to frequently air content such as political talk shows, which are inexpensive to 
produce. The first political talk show in Taiwan started in 1992, and political talk show programs 
became popular around 2000. To this day, there are 10 to 12 television political talk shows and 
call-in programs every night, running one after another.  
In many ways the rapid development and growing popularity of political talk shows follows 
the “the narrative imperative” by which audiences expect media sources “not only to inform but 
also to explain, interpret, persuade and entertain” and to tell stories that hang together and have a 
point of view, rather than simply providing unadulterated information (Mullainathan & Shleifer, 
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2005, p. 1031). Unlike regular television news programs, political talk shows usually reserve a 
designated time slot for hosts and commentators (called “minzui” or famous mouth in Taiwan) 
who address specific issues in a specific length of time. Some talk shows even solicit the 
audience’s participation to generate viewers’ interests and to give viewers a feeling of 
engagement. Through these interactions, hosts and commentators play multiple roles: first, 
“educating” the public about the details, intrigues, and nuisances of a topic; second, “engaging” 
in discussion among themselves and call-in viewers to arouse public attention; and, last, 
“entertaining” viewers with witty quips to soften the hard and dry facts (Lee, 2011). 
To some extent, Taiwanese political talk shows reflect what recent deliberative democracy 
proponents have envisioned as informed and reasoned judgments of the citizenry (Bessette, 1980, 
1994). Deliberative democracy stresses the explicit and implicit reconstruction of political 
deliberation beyond the normative formal decision-making process. It broadens the venues of 
opportunity and accessibility for political participation to constituents beyond the relatively few 
designated representatives, enabling them to engage in self-reflection and critical analysis of 
political issues in a reciprocal manner (Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004). Public engagement in 
deliberation takes time and is likely to foster debates and controversies, but citizen participation 
provides an opportunity to converse, to learn more about policy issues, and to hold political 
leaders accountable (Fishkin, 1995). 
Regrettably, the ideal version of deliberative democracy was never fully materialized in 
Taiwan, given the commercial pressures and the stakeholders that are deeply divided by almost 
irreconcilable differences. Despite the fact that some talk show hosts might prefer civility, 
objectivity, and fairness in issue choice and discussion, they have to market their programs in 
order to win viewers’ loyalty. The necessity to sustain a faithful audience by demonstrating 
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uniqueness in style and substance also becomes a force to push programs away from the center 
and toward one side of the political spectrum. Initially, the programs invited guests with different 
or opposing points of views. However, since 2006, most of the shows would feature the majority 
of guests from either Pan-Blue or Pan-Green coalitions with clear political positions. Similar to 
some American news talk show hosts, some Taiwanese show hosts would occasionally attack or 
accuse political parties and politicians who hold opposing political beliefs or attitudes (e.g., 
Hofstetter & Gianos, 1997; Hall & Cappella, 2002).  
To make the matter worse, different television stations in Taiwan have their own political 
predispositions and it is not uncommon for them to frame or favor certain political issues 
differently (Chang & Lo, 2007). Each talk show’s visible political favoritism and ideological tilt 
attracts a huge amount of commercial advertising to the station from likeminded corporations 
and political parties. For example, the DPP government had long funneled substantial budgetary 
resources into the pan-Green SET (Sanlih Entertainment TV) and FTV (Formosa TV).  
Through framing, talk show hosts, with the tacit support of carefully chosen guest 
commentators as collaborators, determine what angle and what content to include in political 
deliberation as well as what to subtly exclude. Similar to a tactic used in talk shows in other 
countries, talk show framing in Taiwan uses a mix of information and entertainment to elicit 
viewers’ attention to certain readings and aspects of political happenings. Both hosts and 
commentators may prepare a brief summary of topic essentials, provide a flowchart to show 
sequential developments, employ idioms and folk slang for mockeries, and show colorfully 
printed posters or dry erase boards for easy understanding and dialogue stimulation. Sometimes, 
inflammatory titles or subtitles regarding the content of the program serve to evoke debatable 
and imagined implications. The connotations and implications of headings and subtitles 
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implicitly highlight different perspectives of the issue at hand, guide viewers on how to approach 
the issue, and lead viewers to reconsider their interests, sentiments, and political values.       
Talk-show programs tend to keep several regular commentators on their guest lists, mostly 
former print journalists who are witty in quick responses, resourceful in filling in details of daily 
events, and eloquent in their showmanship and argumentation. Their journalistic training and 
experiences equip them well to address sudden events. They are articulate and forceful in style 
and language, employing occasional vulgar expressions. Sometimes, some veteran minzuis even 
stage fights and deliberately exchange diatribes to demonstrate their pluralist perspectives and 
thus imply their “independent and objective” postures in order to gain viewers’ trust and to boost 
ratings. 
Needless to say, politicians welcome the opportunity to appear on talk shows. In a 
symbiotic relationship, politicians court producers and hosts for communication space to boost 
their name recognition, while media professionals cultivate politicians for exclusive coverage 
and access to first-hand information. Talk shows run during all seasons, thus allowing politicians 
to bring forward and spin certain political agendas to test the water, to maintain visibility, or to 
confront opponents rhetorically and publically to demonstrate policy distinction, among other 
functions. 
Instead of reaching a consensual understanding through rigorous debate and dialogue across 
the political divide in a democratic society, political talk shows in Taiwan frequently reinforce 
the level of nondeliberative disagreements (Guttmann & Thompson, 2004) wherein the policy 
stance of one’s opponents is so anathema to one’s morals that no compromise is acceptable. 
Numerous scholars, professionals, and organizations have openly criticized the programs and 
called for self-regulation that balance media rights and responsibilities. The creation of the 
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National Communications Commission in 2006, the authority responsible for regulating 
telecommunications and broadcasting services, seems to suggest that Taiwan finally recognizes 
that free media does not mean unregulated media and that a regulated system is not necessarily 
an undemocratic system (Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2012).   
   Numerous questions could be raised regarding the political talks shows phenomenon in 
Taiwan. In this study, we focus on the questions most directly related to the Taiwanese people, 
i.e., the audiences of the programs. Specifically, this study attempted to address the following 
questions: What are Taiwanese viewers’ attitudes toward political talk shows in specific and 
what are the viewers’ attitudes on politics in general? To what extent do Taiwanese viewers find 
themselves and others susceptible to the influence of political shows? To what extent do the 
viewers’ attitudes toward political talk shows and politics affect their perceived influence of 
political talk shows? And to what extent does the perceived influence of political talk shows 
affect their views about restrictions on such shows?  
In what follows, we will present a review of the theoretical constructs and relevant literature. 
A distinction between the first- and the third-person effect is made to facilitate understanding of 
the perceived influence of political talk shows. Also made is the distinction between attitude 
toward political talk shows and attitude toward politics, both conceptualized as antecedents of 
the perceived first- and third-person effect. A structural equation model, which incorporates all 
hypothesized relationships among the key constructs, will then be presented, followed by a the 
hypotheses testing results. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we present a review of the literature pertaining to the key theoretical 
constructs: First-person effect, third-person effect, attitude toward political talk shows, attitude 
toward politics, and attitude toward talk show restrictions. 
 
First-Person and Third-Person Effect 
Studies in mass communication and public opinion point to the need to distinguish between 
the perceived influence of media on oneself (first-person effect) and the perceived influence on 
others (third-person effect). The same distinction is made in the present study between viewers’ 
perceived influence of political talk shows on themselves and on others.   
The third-person effect perceptual hypothesis, first proposed by Davison (1983), predicts 
that individuals will perceive media messages to have a greater impact on other people than on 
themselves. The hypothesis has generated numerous studies in an effort to explain this 
phenomenon. Some researchers have argued that the third-person effect, at its heart, reflects a 
self-serving bias (Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Gunther & Thorson, 1992). In their meta-analysis, 
Paul, Salwen, and Dupagne (2000) discussed varying sociological and psychological theories 
that have been used to explain the third-person effect and its consequences, including ego 
involvement, the elaboration likelihood model, the social categorization theory, attribution 
theory, and biased optimism.    
The comparison between self and others constitutes a form of unrealistic and biased 
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optimism that is motivated by the need for ego enhancement (Brown, 1986). The same 
motivation also may lead people to think that others are more likely to be harmed by the media; 
if by comparison, it enhances their view of themselves (McLeod et al., 1999). Consequently, the 
more negative a message is perceived, the wider the gap between its perceived influence on self 
and others (Eveland & McLeod, 1999).  
Perloff (1996) notes that the third-person effect is likely to manifest itself when media 
message advocates behavior that will not be beneficial for the self or gives rise to the perception 
that it is not smart to be influenced by the message. The end result is that people surmise others 
to fall victim to media’s influence while they do not. White (1997) also suggests that people are 
likely to consider themselves smarter and more resistant to a message when they feel the topic is 
one that has little benefit, or even potentially harmful consequences, for its audience. Similarly, 
Eveland et al. (1999) argue that the magnitude of the third-person effect perception is influenced 
by the social desirability of the message—the lower the social desirability of the message, the 
stronger the third-person effect.   
Many researchers see the behavioral aspect of the third-person effect as the most socially 
relevant phenomenon. The behavioral aspect suggests that people will favor restricting messages 
that may negatively affect others. McLeod et al. (2001) showed that support for censorship 
stemmed from subjects’ experiencing third-person perception. Salwen and Dupagne (1999) 
found that willingness to support censorship was attributable to the perception that others were 
not wholesome enough to resist immoral influences. In some instances, the support for limiting 
access to media found its justification from a paternalistic attitude and the need to protect others 
from harmful media effects (McLeod, 1999). 
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In a recent study, Wu (2009) presented empirical evidence supporting the presence of the 
perceived third-person effect of political talk shows in Taiwan. Through a large-scale survey 
among Taiwanese adults (n=1980), the study found that respondents generally believed that 
political talk shows had greater negative effects on others than on themselves. Negative effects 
were measured by the lack of trust in politics, the sense of political powerlessness and the 
disappointment in the political environment. Respondents also felt that the greater the perceived 
negative influence of political talk shows on others, the more likely they would be in favor of 
imposing restrictions on such programs. The study further supported the hypotheses that the 
perceived third-person effect is positively correlated with the amount of attention paid to politics 
and negatively correlated with the perceived benefit of political talk shows in the society.      
In contrast to the third-person effect, the first-person effect has been found to occur when 
the potential benefit from a message is high. That is, when media messages are positive and 
advocate beneficial outcomes, people tend to consider themselves just as influenced as others; 
and in some cases, they may anticipate on an even stronger effect on themselves. As Golan and 
Day (2008) indicate, “first-person effect has also been identified when individuals tend to 
perceive a stronger effect for self than others from mediated messages deemed socially 
acceptable to be persuaded by” (pp. 541-542). Gunther and Mundy (1993) point out that as 
interest in the messages increases so does the perceived influence on ourselves. Eveland and 
McLeod (1999) argue that ego enhancement is responsible for the observed first-person effect 
where people view themselves as more persuaded by the desirable media content.   
Gunther and Thorson (1992) made the distinction between messages that are intended to 
inform, such as news, and those that are intended to persuade, such as advertising. They argued 
that people will perceive the two domains of messages accordingly and will show 
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domain-specific processing patterns. Specifically, exposure to news is both sought-after and 
socially desirable, while advertising is usually an event to avoid. Being persuaded by advertising 
is often viewed as detrimental, the general sphere of advertising would thus be likely to exhibit 
the third-person effect.   
However, Gunther and Thorson (1992) also noted that some advertising might induce the 
first-person effect. They examined estimates of influence on self and others in relation to ads that 
contained an emotional appeal and found that although the self and others were equally affected 
by the positively-emotional message, subjects tended to recognize and admit more of an impact 
on themselves than others. Given that advertising messages are typically fun, warm, exciting, 
and thus emotional, one would expect such advertising to induce the first-person effect as well.   
It should also be noted that the first- and the third-person effect are often related. 
Specifically, the perceived influence of media content on self may constitute the basis for the 
assessment of the influence on others. The reasoning is consistent with the hypothesis of 
looking-glass perception which finds individuals to project their own thoughts and feelings onto 
others: “what I think must be what others think” (Fields & Schuman, 1976; Chan & Lee, 2009; 
Ross, Greene & House, 1977). The looking glass perception is assumed to operate quite apart 
from the actual distribution of opinion. Relative to the current study, the hypothesis suggests that 
if Taiwanese people experience the first-person effect of political talk shows, they would project 
the perceived influence onto others in the form of the third-person effect. 
 
Attitude toward Political Talk Shows and Politics 
 Even though there is a rich literature investigating the first and third-person effects and their 
behavioral consequences, a deeper understanding of the effects warrant further analysis on how 
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these effects come about. Within the context of political talk shows, we argue that attitude 
toward politics in general and attitude toward political talk shows in specific are two important 
and related antecedents of perceived first- and third-person effects.   
  The argument is based on the notion that exposure to political talk shows is essentially a 
political behavior. Two predictors of such behavior are experiential and instrumental attitudes 
toward the behavior. Experiential attitudes concern the degree to which an individual perceives a 
behavior to be interesting, whereas instrumental attitudes reflect the degree to which the behavior 
is deemed important (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).   
For those individuals who find politics uninteresting and unimportant, exposure to political 
talk shows will be deemed worthless. These individuals will retain low levels of exposure given 
the perceived lack of utility from this activity and consequently perceive little if any influence of 
exposure on themselves or others. In contrast, for those who find politics interesting and 
important, exposure to political talk shows is not only a form of political participation (McLeod, 
Shah, Hess, & Lee, 2010) but also a eudaimonic (meaningfully enjoyable) activity (Holbert, 
Zeng, & Robinson, 2017). For these individuals, the high interest and importance attached to 
exposure to political talk shows are likely to amplify their perceived influence of exposure on 
themselves and others. 
The reasoning above also points to the intricate relationship between attitude toward politics 
in general and attitude toward political talk shows in particular. If politics can be defined as “the 
activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between 
parties having power” (Oxford) at the macro level, then political talk shows might be viewed as 
an outward micro-manifestation of politics at work. The experiential and instrumental attitudes 
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toward both politics and political talk shows should, therefore, be expected to function in the 
same direction.  
Additional insight into these two attitudes may be obtained from research in related fields. 
In advertising research, for example, a distinction is made between attitude toward advertising in 
general and attitude toward specific advertising messages. The general research finding is that, at 
the micro level, ads that are well-liked are more likely to be attended, remembered, and 
persuasive. A well-liked ad creates a well-liked product (Phelps & Hoy, 1996). Petty & 
Cacioppo’s (1983) study of advertising effects revealed that attitudes toward an advertised 
product were influenced more by their attitude toward the ad, or ad likeability, than thoughts 
about the actual product. Similar findings were obtained in several other studies (e.g., Bergkvist 
& Rossiter 2008; Yelkur, Tomkovick, Hofer, & Rozumalski, 2013; Shavitt, Lowrey, & Hasefner, 
1998; Shen, 1998).    
At the macro level, public attitudes toward advertising in general also have been of interest 
to researchers for years. Advertising researchers have been interested in the impact of overall 
attitudes toward advertising on consumer behavior variables. Studies have suggested, for 
example, that consumers' attitudes toward individual advertisements are influenced by their 
attitudes toward advertising in general. People with more favorable feelings about advertising, in 
general, found specific advertisements more acceptable, informative, and enjoyable (Bartos & 
Dunn, 1974; Bauer & Greyser, 1968; Lutz, 1985). Consumers' overall positive attitude toward all 
advertising is also related positively to involvement with specific advertisements (James & 
Kover, 1992). From a public policy perspective, concerns have been voiced that criticisms of 
advertising (i.e., it presents false and misleading information, it promotes undesirable values, it 
persuades people to buy things they do not need, etc.) may undermine its effectiveness or even 
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lead to pleas for greater regulation (Calfee & Ringold, 1988; Pollay & Mittal, 1993). 
A recent study by Liu, Dong & Tang (2017) conceptualized (macro) attitude toward alcohol 
products and (micro) attitude toward alcohol advertising as antecedents of the perceived first- 
and third-person effects. The study supported the hypothesized relationships between attitude 
toward alcohol products and alcohol advertising, as well as the relationship between attitude 
toward alcohol advertising and perceived first-person influence of alcohol advertising on oneself. 
The results also supported the looking-glass perception hypothesis whereby the perceived 
influence of alcohol advertising on oneself had a strong influence on the perceived influence on 
others, which in turn led to greater support for restrictions on alcohol advertising. 
 This study attempted to model after Liu, Dong & Tang’s (2017) study by examining 
attitudes toward politics and political talk shows as antecedents of the first- and third-person 
effects of political shows in Taiwan. In the next section, we will present specific research 
hypotheses derived from the literature reviewed above. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Hypotheses 
 To facilitate clarity, the following acronyms were used to represent the variables under 
study.  
ATTS: Attitude toward political talk shows.  
ATTP: Attitude toward politics. 
ATTR: Attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows. 
SELF: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself. 
OTHERS: Perceived influence of political talk shows on other people. 
 The first set of hypotheses deals with the relationships among the attitude variables (ATTS, 
ATTP, and ATTR): 
H1: There is a positive correlation between an attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and 
attitude towards politics (ATTP). (ATTS ↔ ATTP) 
H2: Attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) is a negative predictor of attitude toward 
restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR). (ATTS à ATTR) 
H3: Attitude toward politics (ATTP) is a negative predictor of attitude toward restrictions on 
political talk shows (ATTR). (ATTP à ATTR)  
 The second group of hypotheses has to do with the first- and third-person effects: 
H4: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) is a positive predictor of 
attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR). (SELF à ATTR) 
H5: Perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) is a positive predictor of 
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attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR). (OTHERS à ATTR) 
The third set of hypotheses brings together all five variables in the study: ATTS, ATTP, 
SELF, OTHERS and ATTR.  
H6: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) mediates the relationship 
between attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and attitude toward restrictions on political 
talk shows (ATTR). (ATTS à SELF à ATTR) 
H7: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) mediates the relationship 
between attitude toward politics (ATTP) and attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows 
(ATTR). (ATTP à SELF à ATTR) 
H8: Perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) mediates the relationship 
between attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and attitude toward restrictions on political 
talk shows (ATTR). (ATTS à OTHERS à ATTR) 
H9: Perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) mediates the relationship 
between attitude toward politics (ATTP) and attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows 
(ATTR). (ATTP à OTHERS à ATTR) 
The final hypothesis is derived from the hypothesis of looking-glass perception:  
H10: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) is a positive predictor of 
perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS). (SELF → OTHERS)  
The figure below shows the structural equation model that incorporates all above-stated 
hypotheses.    
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Figure 1. Structural Equation Model 
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Chapter Four 
Methodology 
 This section explains the research design and instruments that were used for data collection 
in the study. 
 
Design & Sample 
 An online survey was conducted to collect data for this study. The sample was selected 
through convenient (snowball) sampling, a non-probability sampling technique which aims to 
include all participants that are available at any given time (Babbie, 2001). Specifically, 
approximately 1053 adult Taiwanese citizens were recruited through chain referral via social 
media (e.g., Facebook and Twitter). Qualtrics, a leading web-based survey software application 
was used for data gathering. The use of convenient sampling greatly reduces costs of survey 
labor, time and materials, despite the limited external validity or generalizability of data 
collected. Web-based survey tools allow for the instant transmission of results and eliminate the 
need to manually input data for analysis (Evans & Mathur, 2005). Participation in the survey was 
strictly voluntary and the identities of respondents remain confidential before and after the 
survey. All information collected from respondents was protected and remain confidential 
throughout the research process. The distributions of their gender, level of education, age, and 
frequency of viewing political talk shows are shown in Tables 1 to 4, respectively.  
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Table 1. Sample Gender 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male 356 33.8 41.5 41.5 
Female 502 47.7 58.5 100.0 
Total 858 81.5 100.0  
Missing System 195 18.5   
Total 1053 100.0   
 
 
Table 2. Sample Level of Education 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Did not complete high school 6 .6 .7 .7 
Graduated from high school 49 4.7 5.7 6.4 
Some college 166 15.8 19.4 25.8 
Bachelor's degree 350 33.2 40.8 66.6 
Master's degree 251 23.8 29.3 95.9 
Ph.D. 32 3.0 3.7 99.6 
Other 3 .3 .4 100.0 
Total 857 81.4 100.0  
Missing System 196 18.6   
Total 1053 100.0   
 
Table 3. Sample Age 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
What is your age? 839 15 88 36.85 14.858 
Valid N (listwise) 839     
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Table 4. Sample Political Talk Shows Viewing Frequency 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Never 237 22.5 25.0 25.0 
Sometimes 591 56.1 62.3 87.3 
Very often 120 11.4 12.7 100.0 
Total 948 90.0 100.0  
Missing System 105 10.0   
Total 1053 100.0   
 
 
Survey Instrument 
 The survey questionnaire contains 29 questions and takes about ten minutes to complete. An 
informed consent and survey instructions are presented before the questions. The questionnaire 
was first written in English and then translated into Chinese in order to facilitate responding. 
Appendix B and C provide the English and Chinese versions of the questionnaire, respectively. 
While completing the survey, respondents had the option to either choose not to answer specific 
questions or withdraw altogether.    
 
Measures 
The key variables in this study were measured as follows.  
Attitude toward Politics (ATTP). Measures of attitude toward politics include six Likert 
scaled (5= strongly agree; 1= strongly disagree) items. Consistent with the definition of attitude 
as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree 
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of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken 1993), four items were designed to measure the 
evaluative judgment of Taiwan’s democracy, politicians, political parties and government 
respectively. Two items measured the experiential (interest) and instrumental (importance) 
aspects of attitudes toward politics as prescribed by Holbert, Zeng, and Robinson (2017).   
1. I am satisfied with the way democracy works in Taiwan. 
2. I am satisfied with the performance of politicians in Taiwan. 
3. I am satisfied with the performance of the major political parties in Taiwan. 
4. I am happy with the performance of the Taiwanese government.  
5. I am interested in knowing how politics works in Taiwan. 
6. It is important to understand how politics works in Taiwan. 
  Attitude toward Television Political Talk Shows (ATTS). Measures of attitude toward 
political shows were modified from the attitude-toward-the-news items used in PEW Research 
Center (2004) and the American National Election Studies (2000) surveys. All six items were 
measured by the Likert scale (5= strongly agree; 1= strongly disagree). 
1. I enjoy watching political talk shows on television.  
2. I feel that I can trust political talk shows to report the political news fairly. 
3. Television political talk shows are often biased in its content.(reversed) 
4. Political talk shows on television are often out of touch with people like me. (reversed) 
5. I don’t always trust the views and opinions presented in television political talk shows. 
(reversed) 
6. Television political talk shows often depress me. (reversed) 
Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF). Adapted from Wu (2009) 
and Liu, Dong & Tang (2017), the following four items were used to measure the perceived 
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influence of political talk shows on oneself (i.e., first-person effect) on a 4-point scale (4: a great 
deal of influence, 3: some influence, 2: not much influence, 1: no influence at all).  
1. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences your own political 
views? 
2. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences your own opinions 
about politicians? 
3. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences your own views about 
the government? 
4. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences your own outlook for 
Taiwan?  
Perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS). By changing the 
wording from “your own” to “other people’s,” the following items were used to measure 
perceived influence of political talk shows on others (i.e., the third-person effect) on a 4-point 
scale (4: a great deal of influence, 3: some influence 2: not much influence, 1: no influence at 
all).  
1. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences other people’s political 
views? 
2. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences other people’s 
opinions about politicians? 
3. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences other people’s views 
about the government? 
4. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences other people’s outlook 
for Taiwan.  
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Attitude toward Restrictions on Television Political Talk Shows (ATTR). Three items 
adapted from Lo and Wei (2002) and Wu (2009) were used to measure attitude toward 
restrictions on political talk shows on the Likert Scale (5= strongly agree; 1= strongly disagree). 
1. I support a boycott of television political talk shows. 
2. I support public petitions against television political talk shows. 
3. I support more government restrictions on television political talk shows. 
 In addition to the measures of the key variables above, measures of political ideology, 
political party affiliation, and demographics were also included in the questionnaire.    
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Chapter Five 
Results 
Table 5 displays the means, standards deviations and reliability measures (Cronbach’s 
alphas) of ATTP, ATTS, SELF, OTHERS, ATTR. All Cronbach’s alphas were greater than .70, 
indicating the measures achieved acceptable levels of internal consistency.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive and Reliability Statistics 
  
   
 N of Items Scale Mean Std. Deviation Cronbach’s Alpha 
ATTP 6 2.71 .56 .708 
ATTS 6 2.26 .53 .704 
SELF 4 2.21 .65 .849 
OTHERS 4 2.93 .67 .887 
ATTR 3 2.84 .91 .825 
 
Table 6 shows the results of a paired samples t-test that compared respondents’ perceived 
influence of political talk shows on themselves and on other people. Test results indicated that 
respondents tended to perceive greater influence of political talk shows on others (Mean 
OTHERS = 2.93, SD = .67) than on themselves (Mean SELF = 2.21, SD = .65) (t = - 25.285, df 
= 644, p < 0.001).  
 
Table 6. Paired Samples t-test: Self vs. Others 
 
 Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
t df Sig. Lower Upper 
Pair 
1 
SELF - 
OTHERS 
-.72403 .72727 .02864 -.78026 -.66780 -25.284 644 .000 
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One-sample t-test result (Table 7) showed that all three attitude means were significantly 
lower than the neutral point of 3 on the scale (tATTP = -12.84, df = 644, p < 0.001; tATTS  = -35.55, 
df = 644, p < 0.001, tATTR = -4.50, df = 644, p < 0.001 ), indicating that respondents held 
somewhat negative attitudes toward politics, political talk shows and restrictions on political 
talks shows.  
 
Table 7. One Sample t-tests: ATTP, ATTS, ATTR 
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
ATTP -12.839 644 .000 -.28630 -.3301 -.2425 
ATTS -35.545 644 .000 -.74186 -.7828 -.7009 
ATTR -4.500 644 .000 -.16072 -.2309 -.0906 
 
Measurement Model Results 
 Table 8 shows the standardized regression weight estimates and their standard errors for 
construct indicators. The regression weights for all the indicators are statistically significant 
(P<.001). Additionally, the standard errors are small, indicating acceptable validity of the 
measurement model. 
 
Table 8. Measurement Model Results 
   
Standardized 
regression 
weight 
  
S.E. C.R. P 
ATTS1 ← ATTS .403      
ATTS2 ← ATTS .623   .161 8.356 *** 
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Table 8. Measurement Model Results (Continued) 
   
Standardized 
regression 
weight 
  
S.E. C.R. P 
ATTS3 ← ATTS .617   .138 8.330 *** 
ATTS4 ← ATTS .568   .173 8.078 *** 
ATTS5 ← ATTS .492   .127   7.588 *** 
ATTS6 ← ATTS .544   .159 7.937 *** 
ATTP1 ← ATTP .404      
ATTP2 ← ATTP .785   .150 9.784 *** 
ATTP3 ← ATTP .848   .165 9.946 *** 
ATTP4 ← ATTP .817   .178 9.876 *** 
ATTP5 ← ATTP .112   .093 2.594 .009 
ATTP6 ← ATTP .066   .089 1.540 .123 
Self1 ← SELF .738      
Self2 ← SELF .778   .061 18.440 *** 
Self3 ← SELF .834   .063 19.456 *** 
Self4 ← SELF .714   .067 16.994 *** 
Other1 ← OTHERS .787      
Other3 ← OTHERS .858   .048 23.218 *** 
Other2 ← OTHERS .838   .047 22.649 *** 
Other4 ← OTHERS .785   .051 20.987 *** 
ATTR2 ← ATTR .912   .041    24.345 *** 
ATTR1 ← ATTR .877      
ATTR3 ← ATTR .609   .049 16.558 *** 
*** p<.001 
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Structure Model Results 
 Table 9 shows the results of the structural model obtained through SPSS AMOS. An initial 
question is whether the structural equation analysis estimates for the model provide an adequate 
fit to the data. Although the Chi-square test indicates a lack of model fit (𝑋!=424.05, df = 220, p 
= .000), it should be noted that the Chi-square test is sensitive to large sample sizes like the one 
employed in the present study. Assessment of the model’s fit thus relied on other goodness-of-fit 
indices. Byrne (2001) suggests that models with NFI, RFI, IFI, and CFI values greater than .90, 
and a RMSEA less than or equal to .10 be judged as providing a reasonable fit to the data. 
Similarly, Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend RMSEA values below .06. In this study, all these 
goodness-of-fit indices (NFI = .934, RFI = .914, IFI = .963, TLI = .952, CFI = .963, RMSEA 
= .043) indicate that the model provides acceptable fit to the data. Figure 2 is a pictorial display 
of the structural model results. 
 
Table 9. Structure Model Results 
   
Standardized 
regression 
weight 
  
S.E. C.R. P 
SELF ← ATTS .207   .097 3.037 .002 
SELF ← ATTP -.078   .077 -1.301 .193 
OTHERS ← ATTS -.247   .101 -3.859 *** 
OTHERS ← ATTP -.064   .076 -1.194 .233 
OTHERS ← SELF .488   .053 10.244 *** 
ATTR ← ATTS -.460   .185 -5.871 *** 
ATTR ← ATTP -.101   .116 -1.829 .067 
ATTR ← SELF -.018   .084 -.355 .722 
ATTR ← OTHERS -.065   .075 -1.285 .199 
ATTS ↔ ATTP .551   .015 5.907 *** 
*** p<.001 
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Chi-square = 424.05, df = 220, p = .000  
NFI = .934, RFI = .914, IFI = .963, TLI = .952, CFI = .963, RMSEA = .043 
** p<.01, * p<.05 
  
Figure 2. Structural Model Results (Whole Sample) 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
 This section presents hypotheses testing results, starting with the first group of hypotheses 
which deal with the relationships among the attitude variables (ATTS, ATTP, and ATTR). H1 
states that there is a positive correlation between an attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) 
and attitude toward politics (ATTP). The hypothesis was supported by the positive correlation 
between ATTS and ATTP (r!""#←→!""#= .551, p< .001): As Taiwanese citizens’ attitude toward 
political talk shows becomes more favorable, so does their attitude toward politics, and vice 
versa.  
H2, which states that attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) is a negative predictor of 
attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR), was supported (β!""#→!""#= .460, 
p< .001). However, results failed to support H3 that states attitude toward politics (ATTP) is a 
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negative predictor of attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR) (β!""#→!""#= 
-.101, p= .067). 
 The second group of hypotheses is related to the behavioral aspects of the first- and 
third-person effects (SELF à ATTR and OTHERS à ATTR). H4, which states that perceived 
influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) is a positive predictor of attitude toward 
restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR), was not supported (β!"#$→!""#= -.018, p= .772). 
Similarly, results failed to support H5 which states that perceived influence of political talk 
shows on others (OTHERS) is a positive predictor of attitude toward restrictions on political talk 
shows (ATTR) (β!"#$%&→!""#= -.065, p= .199).  
 The third set of hypotheses, H6 to H9, brings together all five variables in the research: 
ATTS, ATTP, SELF, OTHERS and ATTR. The hypotheses tested whether the perceived 
influence on oneself and others would mediate the effects of attitudes toward political talk shows 
and politics on attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows.  
 H6 states that perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) mediates the 
relationship between attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and attitude toward restrictions 
on political talk shows (ATTR). To support the mediating hypothesis, both paths of ATTS to 
SELF and SELF to ATTR must attain statistical significance. Results showed that the path of 
ATTS to SELF was significant (β ATTS→SELF = .31, p < .01), but the path of SELF to ATTR was 
not (β SELF→ATTR = .07, p = .72). H6 was therefore not supported.  
H7 predicts that perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) mediates the 
relationship between attitude toward politics (ATTP) and attitude toward restrictions on political 
talk shows (ATTR). The hypothesis was not supported because neither the ATTP à SELF nor 
the SELF à ATTR path was statistically significant (β ATTP→SELF = -.08, p = .19; β SELF→ATTR = 
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-.02, p = .72). 
H8 prescribes that perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) mediates 
the relationship between attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and attitude toward 
restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR). The mediating hypothesis would be supported by 
significant paths of ATTS to OTHERS and OTHERS to ATTR. Results showed that the path of 
ATTS to OTHERS did reach significance (β ATTS→OTHERS = -.25, p < .01) but the path of SELF to 
ATTR did not (β OTHERS→ATTR = -.07, p = .23). H8 was therefore not supported.    
H9 predicts that perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) mediates 
the relationship between attitude toward politics (ATTP) and attitude toward restrictions on 
political talk shows (ATTR). The hypothesis was not supported because neither the ATTP à 
OTHERS nor the OTHERS à ATTR path was statistically significant (β ATTP→OTHERS = -.06, p 
= .23; β OTHERS→ATTR = -.07, p = .20).  
The final hypothesis tested the looking-glass perception. H10 states that perceived influence 
of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) is a positive predictor of perceived influence of 
political talk shows on others (OTHERS). The hypothesis was clearly supported by the 
significant path between SELF and OTHERS (β  !"#$→!"#$%&= .488, p< .001), suggesting that 
respondents transferred their perceived influence of political talk shows on themselves onto 
others.  
 The hypothesis testing results presented above were based on the entire sample of the study. 
Further analysis was performed on respondents whose political ideology was neutral and 
non-neutral (Pan-Green or Pan-Blue), respectively. Results from the group analyses were nearly 
identical to those obtained from the whole sample (see Figure 3 and 4). Political ideology was 
therefore not a conditional factor in the present study.  
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Figure 3. Structural Model Results (Ideology Neutral Group) 
** p<.01, * p<.05 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Structural Model Results (Pan-Green & Pan-Blue Group) 
** p<.01, * p<.05 
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Chapter Six 
Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the relationships among Taiwanese audiences’ 
attitudes toward political talk shows and politics, their perceived influence of political talk shows 
on themselves and others, and their attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows. A series 
of hypotheses were proposed and tested, and the results are summarized in Table 10.  
 
Table 10. Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis Relationship Rationale Result 
H1 ATTS←→ATTP Correlation Supported 
H2 ATTS→ATTR Direct effect Supported 
H3 ATTP→ATTR Direct effect Not supported 
H4 SELF→ATTR Direct effect Not supported 
H5 OTHERS→ATTR Direct effect Not supported 
H6 ATTS→SELF→ATTR Indirect (mediated) effect Not supported 
H7 ATTP→SELF→ATTR Indirect (mediated) effect Not supported 
H8 ATTS→OTHERS→ATTR Indirect (mediated) effect Not supported 
H9 ATTP→OTHERS→ATTR Indirect (mediated) effect Not supported 
H10 SELF→OTHERS Looking glass perception Supported 
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The popularity of political talk shows in Taiwan is clearly reflected in the present study in 
that the majority of respondents (75%) watched political talk shows. Most of them (62.3%) 
watched political talk shows sometimes and some (12.7%) watched political talk shows very 
often. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that respondents expressed slightly negative attitudes 
toward both political talk shows and politics. Although these attitudes are significantly correlated 
(r = .551), neither of them was found to be related to respondents’ attitude toward restrictions on 
political talk shows.   
Another interesting finding was that, despite the positive correlation between attitude 
toward political talk shows and politics, only attitude toward political talk shows was related to 
first- and third-person effects. The results suggest that a distinction was made in the minds of the 
respondents between politics and television shows about politics. Regardless of one’s attitude 
toward politics, the perceived influence of political shows on one’s own or others’ political 
views could only be ascribed to one’s attitude toward the shows.   
Results of the study further indicated that respondents’ attitude toward political talk shows 
had opposite relationships with first- and third-person effects: the more (less) favorable 
respondents’ attitude toward political shows, the stronger (weaker) the perceived influence of the 
shows on themselves (β!""#→!"#$  = .207); and conversely, the more (less) favorable respondents’ 
attitude toward the political shows was, the weaker (stronger) the perceived influence of the 
shows on other people (β!""#→!"#$%&  = -.247). The positive relationship between attitude 
toward political talk shows and perceived first-person effect is consistent with prior research 
which generally showed that as the desirability of a message increased, so did the perceived 
influence of the message on oneself (Eveland & McLeod, 1999; Gunther & Thorson, 1992). In 
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this study, respondents who enjoyed watching political talk shows might thus perceive the shows 
to have a beneficial influence on their own political views. Likewise, the negative relationship 
between attitude toward political shows and perceived third-person effect is in agreement with 
prior research that demonstrated that as the undesirability of a message increased, so did the 
perceived influence of the message on others (Eveland & McLeod, 1999; McLeod et al., 1999). 
The more negatively respondents felt about political talk shows, the more likely they would 
expect the shows to have harmful effects on other people’s political views. As reported earlier, 
respondents tended to perceive greater influence of political talk shows on others than on 
themselves, it seems reasonable to surmise that, as the attitude toward political talk shows 
become more extreme, the gap between the perceived influence of the shows on self and others 
would become wider. Collectively, these results provide strong support for the assumption that 
attitude toward political talk shows serves as the precursor to both first- and third-person effects.     
 Perhaps the most intriguing finding of the present study is the absence of the mediating 
process. That is, although respondents’ attitude toward political show was related to the 
perceived influence of political talk shows on themselves and others, the perceived influence was 
not related to their attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows. Essentially the respondents 
were saying, “we may not like political talk shows and our political views may be affected by 
these shows, but do not restrict the shows for our or others’ sake.” The results thus directly 
contradict the generally presumed behavioral consequences of the first-person effect (that people 
would favor restricting messages that may negatively affect themselves) or the third-person 
effect (that people would support restricting messages to protect others from harmful effects) 
(e.g., McLeod, 1999; McLeod et al., 2001; Salwen and Dupagne,1999). One possible explanation 
for the lack of support for restrictions observed in this study is the deep appreciation and respect 
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for free speech among the Taiwanese -- despite the endless conflicts between different political 
factions and the controversial role the media have played in Taiwan’s democratization process. 
Even if Taiwanese people do not like the content of political talk shows or disagree with their 
views and positions, they would still consider the shows to be covered under freedom of speech 
and expression, thus worthy of constitutional protection.     
Finally, the positive path leading first-person to third-person effect lent strong support for 
the presence of looking-glass perception through which respondents projected their perceived 
influence on themselves to that on others -- if political talk show has an impact on me, it must 
also have an impact on others. However, the looking-glass perception should not be confused 
with the false consensus effect -- the cognitive bias that leads people to believe that their own 
opinions are the norms and that the majority of people share the same opinions (Ross, Greene, & 
House, 1977). As noted above, while the perceived first-person effect of political talk shows was 
positive, the perceived third-person effect of political shows was negative. In other words, the 
looking-glass perception observed in this study was neither false nor a consensus.      
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Chapter Seven  
Conclusions 
This thesis represents perhaps the first empirical study of the first-person and third-person 
effects of political talk shows as well as their attitudinal antecedents and consequences in Taiwan. 
The general results showed that political talk shows had significant but opposite perceived 
influence on self and others. Unlike previous studies that often stressed the importance of either 
the first- or the third-person effect, this study demonstrated the coexistence of both effects in the 
context of political communications. Contrary to prior studies that apprised such behavioral 
consequences of third-person effect as speech restrictions or censorship, this study found no such 
evidence. Results of the present study suggest that media audience are willing and able to 
counter the perceived influence of political communications on themselves and others in order to 
uphold the constitutionally protected freedom of political speech and expression.       
This research also extended previous studies by showing the intricate relationship between 
the first- and the third-person effect. By projecting one’s own views to others through looking 
glass perception, the first-person effect may actually give more impetus to the third-person effect 
in evaluating the effects of political communications. While the tendency to project one’s own 
views onto others may not be unique to the Taiwanese, the Taiwanese seem to have a keen sense 
of the importance of knowing what their fellow citizens think and feel when living together in a 
young and still fragile democracy. In that sense, the looking glass perception serves as a 
psychological conduit between first- and third-person effects.      
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Like other empirical studies, this study has several limitations. First, the study results are 
limited in terms of their generalizability because data were gathered from a convenience sample 
of respondents who resided mostly in the northern part of Taiwan. Future research based on more 
representative populations is therefore needed. Second, the survey data and structural equation 
modeling (SEM) analysis used in this study dealt with correlation, not causation (Everitt & Dunn, 
1991). It is also likely that this study merely illuminated one of several theoretically viable 
models of the relationships among the variables. Future research should thus attempt to the test 
different models to better determine the validity of alternative theoretical explanations and 
predictions.  
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Appendix A 
 
Taiwan Profile: Timeline 
 
Source: BBC News (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16178545) 
 
1683 - China's Qing Dynasty formally annexes Taiwan, which had hitherto been divided 
between aboriginal kingdoms and Chinese and European settlers, most prominently the Dutch. 
 
1895 - China cedes Taiwan among other territories to Japan after losing the First Sino-Japanese 
War. 
 
1915 - Tapani Incident prompts Japan to reform its administration of the settled population, 
which turns to civic and political activity. Japanese treatment of aboriginal population remains 
harsh. 
 
1930 - Troops crush last major aboriginal uprising, the Wushe Rebellion. 
 
1942 - Chinese Kuomintang government renounces all treaties with Japan and demands the 
return of Taiwan as part of any post-war settlement, which is endorsed by the Allies in the Cairo 
Declaration the following year. 
 
1945 - US places Taiwan under Chinese administrative control after Japan surrenders. 
 
1947 - Discontent with centralised rule by Kuomintang mainlanders boils over in 228 Incident. 
Chinese authorities imposes martial law, kill large numbers of protesters demanding free 
elections and clean government, and ban thousands of others from political activity. 
 
1949 - Communist victory in Chinese Civil War leads to evacuation of Kuomintang government 
to Taiwan, along with about two million refugees. Mainlanders dominate island until the end of 
martial law in 1987. 
Taiwan-based Republic of China government retains UN and Western recognition as legitimate 
government of all China until the 1970s. 
 
1950s-1960s - Rapid industrial development stimulated by export-oriented policy and US 
economic aid, while Kuomintang justifies one-party rule on the grounds of opposing any 
Communist threat. 
 
1971 - UN recognises Communist China as sole government of whole country after veteran 
Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek refuses dual-representation deal. People's Republic takes 
over China's UN Security Council seat. 
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1975 - Chiang Kai-shek dies. His son Chiang Ching-kuo begins cautious policy of liberalisation, 
including the promotion of more native Taiwanese to positions of authority. 
 
1977 - First opposition breakthrough at parliamentary elections by the Tangwai (Outside the 
Party) group. 
 
1979 - Kaohsiung Incident, in which police kill pro-democracy protesters and arrest all available 
opposition leaders. International attention drawn to the Kuomintang's repressive rule. 
 
1980 - Opposition leaders sentenced to long prison sentences over the Kaohsiung Incident. 
 
1986 - Authorities do not prevent Democratic Progressive Party from organising, despite 
nominal ban on opposition parties. Candidates stand in elections under Tangwai banner. 
 
1987 - Chiang Ching-kuo abolishes martial law, allows family visits to mainland. 
 
1988 - Chiang dies. His chosen successor, Taiwan-born Lee Teng-hui, launches 'Taiwanisation' 
policy to dismantle many structures left over from 1949 and relaxes restrictions on native 
language and culture. 
 
1996 - Free elections, in which Lee beats Democratic Progressive Party's Peng Min-ming. 
Communist China tries to disrupt elections with missile tests, urtailed by US dispatch of aircraft 
carriers to the region. 
 
2000 March - Chen Shui-bian wins presidential elections, ending the Kuomintang party's 50-year 
monopoly of power. 
 
2000 May - Chen Shui-bian says in his inaugural speech that he will not declare independence as 
long as China does not attack. He says he won't call for a referendum on independence, nor 
abolish Taipei's official blueprint for an eventual reunion with mainland China. 
China responds by accusing him of insincerity, and by saying he had evaded the key question of 
whether he considered Taiwan part of China. 
 
2000 August - President Chen Shui-bian stops over briefly in the United States before starting a 
two-week tour of Central America and Africa. He gets no official welcome. 
 
2000 October - Government halts work on the construction of a nuclear power plant, sparking a 
major political row. It argues that the facility - approved and started under the previous 
government - would not be a safe source of energy. 
 
2000 October - Chang Chun-hsiung sworn in as prime minister. He replaces Tang Fei, from the 
main opposition Nationalist Party, who stepped down amid disputes with President Chen, over 
issues including the scrapping of the nuclear plant. 
 
2001 April - The exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, meets President Chen during a 
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visit which draws strong opposition from China. 
 
2001 April - US says it will go ahead with sales of submarines, warships and anti-submarine 
aircraft, but not the requested naval combat radar system Aegis. China protests and President 
George W Bush pledges to help Taiwan should China invade. 
 
2001 June - Taiwan test-fires Patriot anti-missile defence system bought from US, as China 
carries out military exercises simulating invasion of island. 
 
2001 November - Taipei lifts a 50-year ban on direct trade and investment with China. 
 
2001 December - Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party loses its parliamentary majority for the 
first time. 
 
2002 January - Taiwan officially enters the World Trade Organisation, only a few weeks after 
China. 
 
2003 May - Dramatic rise in cases of the pneumonia-like Sars virus. 
 
2003 July - Taiwan is the final country to be removed from the WHO's list of countries which 
were badly affected by the Sars virus. 
 
2003 November - Taiwan unveils the 508-metre Taipei 101 building, which it says is the world's 
tallest. 
 
2003 November - Parliament approves bill to allow referendum on declaring independence 
should China attack. Referendums on sovereignty and changing country's name are not 
sanctioned. 
 
2004 March - President Chen Shui-bian wins a second term by a slender margin. His win follows 
an apparent assassination attempt against him on the eve of elections. 
 
2004 November - Court rejects opposition challenge that President Chen Shui-bian won March's 
presidential election unfairly. 
 
2005 January - Aircraft chartered for the Lunar New Year holiday make the first direct flights 
between Taiwan and China since 1949. 
 
2005 March - Taiwan condemns a new Chinese law giving Beijing the legal right to use force 
should Taipei declare formal independence. 
 
2005 April - National Party (KMT) leader Lien Chan visits China for the first meeting between 
Nationalist and Communist Party leaders since 1949. 
 
2005 June - Reform requiring future constitutional amendments to be put to a referendum 
arouses China's concern that it will be easier for activists to promote moves towards 
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independence. 
 
2005 July - National Party (KMT) elects mayor of Taipei Ma Ying Jeou as its new leader. 
 
2005 December - Opposition KMT triumphs in municipal elections. The result is interpreted as a 
mid-term vote of no confidence in President Chen Shui-bian. 
 
2006 February - Taiwan scraps the National Unification Council, a body set up to deal with 
reunification with the mainland. China says the decision could bring "disaster". 
 
2006 June - Under pressure over corruption allegations against a family member, President Chen 
cedes some of his powers to the prime minister. 
 
2006 October - President Chen survives an attempt by parliament to force a referendum on his 
rule - the second in four months. His opponents and supporters take to the streets. 
 
2006 December - An earthquake off Taiwan cuts undersea cables, cutting off or limiting 
telecommunications across the region. 
 
2007 January - Taiwan defends school history textbooks which refer to China. Beijing accuses 
Taipei of introducing independence ideologies into the classroom. 
 
2007 March - Newspaper reports that Taiwan has test-fired cruise missile capable of hitting 
Shanghai or Hong Kong. 
 
2007 March - Taiwanese government begins removing statue of Chiang Kai-shek from 
Kaohsiung, sparking protests. 
 
2007 April - China and Taiwan clash over route of Olympic torch relay ahead of 2008 Beijing 
games. 
 
2007 August - The country attempts to join the UN for the first time under the name Taiwan, 
rather than the official title of Republic of China. The application is rejected. 
 
2008 January - Opposition KMT wins landslide victory in parliamentary elections, beating 
President Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Mr Chen steps down from post 
of DPP chairman. 
 
2008 March - Presidential elections. Ma Ying-jeou of the opposition Kuomintang Party is elected 
president. 
 
2008 June - First formal talks with China since dialogue was suspended in 1999. 
 
2008 July - President Ma apologises for the killing and imprisonment of tens of thousands of 
political dissidents in the 1950s and 60s - a period known as the white terror. The violence took 
place when martial law was imposed by the Kuomintang party after its leaders fled to the island 
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in 1949 at the end of the Chinese civil war. 
 
2008 November - The highest ranking Chinese official to visit Taiwan in more than half a 
century holds talks in Taipei on improving relations. The visit of Chen Yunlin, China's top 
negotiator on Taiwan, was met with protests by pro-independence supporters. 
Former President Chen Shui-bian arrested and charged with money laundering, bribery and 
embezzlement of government funds. Mr Chen said the allegations were politically motivated. 
 
2008 December - Gift of two giant pandas by China seen as a further improvement in relations. 
 
2009 March - Former President Chen Shui-bian goes on trial on charges including taking bribes, 
money laundering and extortion. 
 
2009 April - China drops longstanding objections to Taiwan's participation in World Health 
Organisation. Taiwan says it will lift ban on investment from China. 
 
2009 May - Chinese President Hu Jintao and the chairman of the governing Kuomintang (KMT) 
party, Wu Po-hsiung, agree to talks on a wide-ranging trade pact. 
 
2009 July - The leaders of China and Taiwan exchange direct messages for the first time in more 
than 60 years, in a sign of warming ties. 
 
2009 August - Typhoon Morakot hits southern Taiwan, leaving hundreds dead in floods and 
mudslides. In September, premier Liu Chao-shiuan resigns amid criticism of the government's 
response. 
 
2010 January - US approves the sale of air defence missiles to Taiwan under a proposed $6.7bn 
arms package. China suspends military contacts with the US, imposes sanctions on US firms 
involved. 
 
2010 June - Taiwan and China sign landmark free trade pact seen as most significant agreement 
in 60 years of separation. 
 
2011 February - A senior army officer is detained on suspicion of spying for China. 
 
2011 March - Five convicted murderers are executed, the second use of the death penalty in the 
past year. 
 
2012 January - President Ma Ying-jeou wins a second term in office. 
 
2012 July - Taiwan's economy contracts in three months to end of June, as the global slowdown 
weighed on export-dependent countries. Economy contracted 0.16% compared with the previous 
year. 
 
2012 August - China and Taiwan sign investment protection deal that sets up formal channels to 
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settle disputes. It details rights of Taiwanese investors if detained by Chinese authorities and vice 
versa. China is Taiwan's biggest trading partner, with bilateral trade worth $110bn (£70bn) a 
year. 
 
2013 January - Japan turns back a small Taiwanese boat from East China Sea islands claimed by 
China and Taiwan. The row has left ties between Tokyo and Beijing severely strained. Four 
Taiwanese coastguard vessels escorted the boat. The islands are called Senkaku in Japan, 
Diaoyutai in Taiwan and Diaoyu in China. 
 
2013 April - Taiwan holds its first live fire drills in five years, after President Ma Ying-jeou 
warns about China's rising military investment. 
 
2013 May - Major diplomatic row erupts between Taiwan and Philippines after Filipino 
coastguards kill a Taiwanese fisherman in disputed waters. 
 
2013 June - Taiwan and China sign cross-Strait services trade agreement, which allows the two 
sides to invest much more freely in one another's services market. 
 
2013 October - Services trade agreement signed with China in June is stalled in Taiwan's 
parliament by opposition MPs, amid concerns that it will hurt industry and small businesses. 
 
2014 February - China and Taiwan hold their first government-to-government talks since the 
Communists came to power in 1949. The Taiwanese government minister in charge of the 
island's China policy meets his mainland counterpart in the eastern city of Nanjing. 
 
2014 March - Opposition supporters occupy parliament to protest at cross-Strait services trade 
agreement, which they say would allow the mainland excessive influence over the Taiwanese 
economy by freeing up direct investment rules. Parliament has not yet ratified it. 
 
2014 April - The head of the US Environmental Protection Agency visits Taiwan, the first visit 
by a cabinet-level US official for 14 years. 
 
2014 June - The most senior Chinese official overseeing ties with Taiwan visits the island, amid 
controversy over a proposed trade pact. 
 
2014 August - Dozens are killed and hundreds injured after a gas leak causes huge explosions in 
Taiwan's second largest city, Kaohsiung. 
 
2014 October - Taiwan bans its senior government officials from higher studies in mainland 
China, citing national security reasons. 
 
2014 December - President Ma Ying-jeou resigns as chairman of the ruling Kuomintang party 
after its crushing defeat in local elections. The polls were seen as a referendum on Mr Ma's 
pro-China policies. 
 
2015 January - Former President Chen Shui-bian is released from prison on medical parole after 
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after serving six years of a 20-year sentence for corruption. 
 
2015 January - Mayor of New Taipei Eric Chu is elected chairman of the ruling Kuomintang 
(KMT) party. 
 
2015 February - Prosecutors charge 118 people with offences related to the occupation of the 
island's parliament and government offices in 2014, dubbed the "Sunflower Movement", in 
protest over a proposed trade pact with China. 
 
2015 March - China postpones the launch of four new flight routes near Taiwan after a fierce 
backlash from the island's authorities over the plan. 
 
2015 October - The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party drops Hung Hsiu-chu as its presidential 
candidate following a series of poor opinion poll ratings. She had been the party's first female 
candidate for the post. 
 
2015 November - Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou and China's President Xi Jinping hold 
historic talks in Singapore, the first such meeting since the Chinese Civil War finished and the 
nations split in 1949. 
 
2016 January - Pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ing-wen wins 
presidential election, takes office in May. 
 
2017 June - Panama switches diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, in a major coup for 
the latter. Sao Tome and Principe did the same in December 2016, leaving Taiwan to enjoy full 
diplomatic relations with only 20 other countries. 
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Appendix B 
Survey Questionnaire (English) 
[INFORMED CONSENT] 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. Although you are not required to answer 
any question that you consider personal, we would like you to answer as many 
questions as possible.  Please select or mark your answers clearly.   
 
 
1.  How often do you watch political talk shows on television? 
 [1] never    [2] sometimes    [3] very often 
 (if never, skip to Question 25)  
 
We’d like to know how you feel about some statements about politics in Taiwan. Please 
tell us the extent that you agree or disagree with each of the statements below.   
 
2. I like the way democracy works in Taiwan. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
3. I am satisfied with the performance of politicians in Taiwan. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
4. I am satisfied with the performance of the major political parties in Taiwan. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
5. I am happy with the performance of the Taiwanese government.  
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
6. I am interested in knowing how politics works in Taiwan. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
7. It is important to understand how politics works in Taiwan. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
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The following statements relate to television political talk shows. Please tell us the 
extent that you agree or disagree with each statement.   
 
8. I enjoy watching political talk shows on television.  
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
9. I feel that I can trust political talk shows to report the political news fairly. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
10. Television political talk shows are often biased in its content.  
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
11. Political talk shows on television are often out of touch with people like me. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
12. I don’t always trust the views and opinions presented in television political talk shows. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
13. Television political talk shows often depress me. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
Please tell us the extent to which watching political talk shows has an influence on your 
own thoughts and behavior.   
 
14. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence your own political views? 
 [1] no influence at all   [2] very little influence   [3] some influence  [4] a great deal of influence  
    
15. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence your own opinions about  
   politicians? 
 [1] no influence at all   [2] very little influence   [3] some influence  [4] a great deal of influence 
16. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence your own views about the  
   government? 
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 [1] no influence at all   [2] very little influence   [3] some influence  [4] a great deal of influence 
 
17. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence your own outlook for  
   Taiwan? 
 [1] no influence at all   [2] very little influence   [3] some influence  [4] a great deal of influence 
 
Please tell us the extent to which watching political talk shows has an influence on other 
people’s thoughts and behavior.   
 
18. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence other people’s political  
   views? 
 [1] no influence at all   [2] very little influence   [3] some influence  [4] a great deal of influence 
 
19. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence other people’s opinions      
   about politicians? 
 [1] no influence at all   [2] very little influence   [3] some influence  [4] a great deal of influence 
 
20. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence other people’s views about  
   the government? 
 [1] no influence at all   [2] very little influence   [3] some influence  [4] a great deal of influence 
 
21. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence other people’s outlook for   
   Taiwan? 
 [1] no influence at all   [2] very little influence   [3] some influence  [4] a great deal of influence 
 
Some people have suggested that there ought to be some forms of restrictions on television 
political shows. Please tell us the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
restrictions.  
 
22. There should be a boycott of television political talk shows. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
23. People in Taiwan should petition against television political talk shows. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
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24. The government should impose restrictions on television political talk shows. 
 [1] strongly disagree    [2] disagree     [3] neutral    [4] agree    [5] strongly agree 
 
Finally, a few background questions about you. 
25. Generally speaking, your political ideology is: 
 [1] pan-green      [2] pan-blue      [3] neutral  
 
26. Are you a member of the following political parties? 
 [1] Kuomintang    [2] Democratic Progressive Party    [3] People First Party   [4] New Party     
 [5] New Power Party     [6] None of the above 
 
  
27. What is your level of education? 
[1] did not complete high school   [2] graduated from high school   [3] some college  [4] bachelor’s 
degree   [5] master’s degree   [6] Ph.D.    [7] other: _______________ 
   
28. What is your age?  _______________ years old 
  
29. Your gender is:     [1] male        [2] female   
 
 
This concludes the survey. Thank you! 
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Appendix C 
Survey Questionnaire (Chinese) 
政論節目的態度調查  
 
[研究參與知情同意書] 
 
感謝您參與此次研究調查。雖然您不需要回答任何您認為關於私人的問題，但我們
希望您能盡可能地回答本調查的問題。請清楚地選擇或標記您的答案，謝謝。 
 
1. 您平常多久看一次電視政論節目？ 
   [1] 從不看 [2] 偶爾看 [3] 時常看 (如果從不看，跳至 25 題) 
 
我們想知道您對台灣政治的感受，請告訴我們對以下的論述您同意的程度。 
 
2. 我喜歡民主制度在台灣的運作。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
3. 我對台灣政治人物的表現感到滿意。 
[1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
4. 我對台灣主要政黨的表現感到滿意。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
5. 我對台灣政府的表現感到滿意。 
   [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
6. 我有興趣了解台灣的政治運作。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
	   61	  
 
7. 對我而言，了解政治在台灣如何運作是很重要的。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
以下的問題與電視政論節目有關，請告訴我們您對於各項陳述同意的程度。 
 
8. 我喜歡看電視政論節目。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
9. 我相信政論節目可以公正地報導政治新聞。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
10. 電視政論節目的內容往往有偏見。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
11. 電視上的政論節目經常與我的現實生活脫節。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
12. 我並不總是相信電視政論節目中提出的意見和看法。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
13. 電視政論節目經常讓我感到沮喪。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
請告訴我們，觀看政論節目對您自己的想法和行為有什麼程度的影響。 
 
14. 就政治觀點而言，電視政論節目對您本身影響的程度是： 
 [1] 完全沒影響    [2] 很小的影響     [3] 有一些影響    [4] 有很大影響     
 
15. 就政治人物的看法而言，電視政論節目對您本身影響的程度是： 
 [1] 完全沒影響    [2] 很小的影響     [3] 有一些影響    [4] 有很大影響     
 
16. 就政府的看法而言，電視政論節目對您本身影響的程度是： 
 [1] 完全沒影響    [2] 很小的影響     [3] 有一些影響    [4] 有很大影響     
 
17. 就台灣的前景而言，電視政論節目對您本身的影響程度是： 
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 [1] 完全沒影響    [2] 很小的影響     [3] 有一些影響    [4] 有很大影響     
 
請告訴我們，觀看政論節目對其他人的想法和行為有什麼程度的影響。 
 
18. 就政治觀點而言，電視政論節目對其他人的影響程度是： 
 [1] 完全沒影響    [2] 很小的影響     [3] 有一些影響    [4] 有很大影響     
 
19. 就政治人物的看法而言，電視政論節目對其他人的影響程度是： 
 [1] 完全沒影響    [2] 很小的影響     [3] 有一些影響    [4] 有很大影響     
 
20. 就政府的看法而言，電視政論節目對其他人的影響程度是： 
 [1] 完全沒影響    [2] 很小的影響     [3] 有一些影響    [4] 有很大影響     
 
21. 就台灣的前景而言，電視政論節目對其他人的影響程度是： 
 [1] 完全沒影響    [2] 很小的影響     [3] 有一些影響    [4] 有很大影響     
 
有人建議對電視政論節目應該採取某些限制。請告訴我們您同意或不同意以下的限
制。 
 
22. 應該抵制政論節目。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
23. 台灣民眾應當請願反對政論節目。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
24. 政府應該對政論節目施加限制。 
 [1] 非常不同意    [2] 不同意     [3] 中立    [4] 同意    [5] 非常同意 
 
最後，還有幾個關於您的問題。 
 
25.  一般來說，您的政治意識型態是：  
   [1] 親藍    [2] 親綠     [3] 中立 
 
26. 你是以下政黨的成員嗎？ 
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[1] 國民黨   [2] 民進黨    [3] 親民黨    [4] 新黨    [5] 時代力量     [6] 無黨籍 
 
27. 您的教育程度： 
[1] 高中職以下   [2] 高中職    [3] 大專    [4] 學士    [5] 碩士     [6] 博士     [7] 其
他：_______________ 
 
28. 您的年齡：  _______________  
  
29. 您的性別：     [1] 男        [2] 女   
 
調查結束。謝謝！ 
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2/28/2018  
 
Shou-Chen Hsieh  
School of Advertising and Mass Communications 
4202 E Fowler Ave. 
Tampa, FL 33620 
 
RE: 
 
Exempt Certification 
IRB#: Pro00032601 
Title: Political Talk Shows in Taiwan: First- and Third-Person Effects and Their Attitudinal 
Antecedents  
 
Dear S. Hsieh: 
 
On 2/28/2018, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria 
for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b): 
 
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), 
survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: 
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, 
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human 
subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or 
civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation. 
 
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is 
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in 
the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.  
 
Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the application is 
closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that was previously 
declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation 
of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not 
warrant an amendment or new application. 
Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does not 
limit your ability to conduct your research project. 
 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University 
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections.  If you have 
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